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ABSTRACT: We investigate a mechanism that facilitates the provision of public goods in a 
network formation game. We show how competition for status encourages a core player to 
realize efficiency gains for the entire group. In a laboratory experiment we systematically 
examine the effects of group size and status rents. The experimental results provide very clear 
support for a competition for status dynamic that predicts when, and if so which, repeated 
game equilibrium is reached. Two control treatments allow us to reject the possibility that the 
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The provision of public goods often benefits from the exemplary performance of a small 
subset of players. People volunteering to help out at amateur sports teams, for example, 
usually show extraordinary dedication and spend a substantial part of their free time working 
at the club instead of being with their families. Academics spend much more time organizing 
workshops than can reasonably be expected in a one-shot game and editors dedicate a lot of 
their time to their journals without proper contingent reimbursement. A very small set of 
people is usually responsible for developing open source software (OSS; Lerner and Tirole 
2002; Crowston et al. 2006) and a limited number of people make most contributions to 
Wikipedia (Voss 2005; Ortega et al. 2008). 
The ease with which examples of efficient public good provision by a small subset of 
a group come to mind contrasts sharply with observed behavior in laboratory experiments. In 
applications where the efficient outcome can only be supported as an equilibrium of the 
repeated game, coordination on this efficient outcome is rarely observed in the laboratory. In 
fact, such experimental supergame results are by and large limited to games with two players, 
and even there efficient play tends to be fragile (see for instance the evidence reviewed in 
Huck et al. 2004). An additional behavioral mechanism is usually needed to support the 
emergence of the efficient outcome. Examples of such mechanisms include the possibility to 
punish defectors in public good games (Fehr and Gächter 2000) and the possibility to exclude 
badly behaving members from consuming the public good (Cinbyabuguma et al. 2005). 
These mechanisms cannot explain the efficient provision of a public good by only a few 
members as in the examples above, however. 
In this paper, we explore the effectiveness of a novel behavioral mechanism that 
allows players to realize efficiency gains in repeated games. This is based on the intuition 
that in many examples of successful public good provision, competition for „status‟ plays an 
essential role. Status may yield an internalized psychological reward; for example, 
contributors may be driven by the prestige or warm glow that their exemplary behavior 
generates (Lakhani and Wolf 2005; von Krogh and von Hippel 2006; Fershtman and Gandal 
2011). Alternatively, status may yield expectations of material returns, e.g., contributors like 
OSS-developers may recognize that their conspicuous contributions can serve as a stepping 
stone to a better job in the future (Lerner and Tirole 2002; 2005); or may lead to payments by 
a third party, e.g. through advertisements (Roberts et al. 2006). In this paper, we will refer to 
all such benefits (psychological and material) as „status rents‟. Status rents will encourage 
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players to compete in terms of „good‟ behavior. The most important contribution of our paper 
is that we show how – if the rents are high enough – competition for status encourages a 
single player to realize efficiency gains for the entire group. We identify the circumstances 
under which inefficient provision, efficient provision and even overprovision of the public 
good are to be expected.  
The model introduced by Galeotti and Goyal (2010) – GG hereafter – provides a 
fruitful theoretical structure for our analysis. In their network formation game, each player 
simultaneously chooses links to other players and their own investment to the public good. 
Players consume some public good, for instance OSS code, which they can do either by 
investing personally (writing code) or by making links to others who invest in the public 
good (using someone else‟s publicly available code).  
In GG‟s baseline model there are no status rents. We introduce these in their model by 
awarding players a monetary payoff for each incoming link. GG‟s main result is that in every 
strict equilibrium of the game, the number of players who invest in the public good is limited. 
These players – „the influencers‟ – form the core of the network. Other (periphery) players 
link to the core, without contributing themselves. Together, the players form a core-periphery 
network. If the core consists of only one player, we say that a star has formed. Important for 
our purpose is that GG‟s main result is unaffected by the introduction of status rents.1 
In the one-shot game that GG study, efficient cooperation is not supported in 
equilibrium. In the finitely repeated game that we are interested in, a plethora of equilibria 
can be supported in equilibrium, including one with efficient provision of the public good 
almost until the end. To shed light on which of these repeated game equilibria is to be 
expected, we introduce a simple behavioral model in which selfish players compete for 
network positions (or status rents). In this model, we assume that players are forward looking 
with limited foresight. The model predicts whether a repeated game equilibrium will be 
reached, and if so, which one.  
In situations without status rents, the periphery position is more attractive than the 
core position. In these circumstances, players prefer others to do the painful job of providing 
the public good, and the behavioral model predicts that the star networks are unstable and 
inefficiency will result. With status rents, the core position can become more attractive than a 
                                                        
1 GG‟s model explains findings reported in early work by Lazarsfeld et al. (1944) and Katz and Lazarsfeld 
(1955). These suggest that individuals‟ roles in the network are distributed in a specific way, where a limited 
number of individuals influence the majority. This has been observed in applications as diverse as fashion, 
opinions and voting. These observations imply that information is typically acquired and shared in networks 
with a core-periphery structure, where a small core acquires information and a large periphery free rides. 
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periphery position. As a consequence, players will compete to be in the core. We show how 
the person willing to invest most in the public good attracts all links and becomes the core 
player in a star network. Competition for status forces the core player to invest up to the level 
where payoffs across network positions are roughly equalized, i.e. to the point where 
periphery players no longer have an incentive to challenge the core player by investing more. 
This process yields a repeated game equilibrium with an investment in the public good that 
follows from the parameters of the game. 
In the laboratory, we investigate how competition for status affects public good 
provision in an environment where players decide both on their contributions and on their 
network connections. In particular, we consider two network characteristics that according to 
the behavioral model will systematically affect the extent to which the public good is 
provided and the structure and stability of the network. The first is the extent of status rents 
that a player derives from incoming links; these rents are absent, of medium value or of high 
value. The second characteristic is group size, which is either small (4 players) or large (8 
players). In a full 3x2 design, we systematically vary status rents and group size in such a 
way that the (stage-game) equilibrium predictions of the GG model remain unaffected.  
In contrast, our behavioral model predicts that behavior will vary systematically 
across our two treatment dimensions. Only with sufficiently large status rents, we predict 
convergence to a stable (equilibrium) outcome. The particular equilibrium selected depends 
on the two characteristics. Essentially, provision of the public good benefits from an increase 
in status rents per link as well as from an increase in group size.
2
 Finally, we add two control 
treatments to the design, in which the network structure is exogenously imposed and based on 
actual networks formed in the endogenous counterparts. This allows us to isolate the 
competition-for-status explanation from other possible explanations of contributions by the 
core (e.g., certain kinds of other-regarding preferences). 
 In our experiments, we implement the game in a straightforward manner. Subjects 
participate in only one of the eight (3x2+2) treatments. They are informed that they remain in 
the same group for 75 periods and they are informed of the relevant parameters (most 
importantly, group size, status rents, linking costs, the costs of investing in the public good 
and the benefits that they derive from having access to the public good). They know that they 
have access to their own public good investments and to the investments of the players to 
                                                        
2 In the working paper that this paper supersedes (van Leeuwen et al. 2013), we considered four treatments that 
differed in many respects from the treatments reported here. The behavioral model that we propose in this paper 
was inspired by studying the individual data of our working paper. Importantly, all tests of the model are out of 
sample. None of the data collected for the previous paper are used here.  
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whom they have created links. In each period, subjects simultaneously make their links and 
investment decisions (except in the control treatments, where they only make investment 
decisions).  
Our experimental results for the treatments with endogenous network formation 
provide clear evidence that participants compete for status rents. The existence of status rents 
is necessary for stable star networks to form and the extent of such rents and group size both 
boost the provision of the public good. Without status rents, even in the final 25 periods star 
networks are only observed in 10% of the cases. This means that in almost all cases, public 
good provision is decentralized and subjects access on average less of the public good than 
the stage-game Nash amount. As a result, outcomes are highly inefficient and average 
experimental earnings are even below what could be expected if there was no scope for 
networks to form. At the other extreme (with high status rents), in the final 25 periods 
subjects in the core of a star contribute close to the efficient amount (on average 97% of the 
efficient amount) when groups are small and they vastly overcontribute when group are large 
(on average 173% of the efficient amount). In these cases a star network is formed in 53% 
and 86% of the cases, respectively. Note that in our network game group size has a positive 
influence on contributions to the group. This is in sharp contrast to previous experiments on 
supergame effects. Finally, in the treatments with high status rents, but also in the treatment 
with medium status rents and large groups, we observe that groups mostly converge to 
„superstars‟, in which the core player invests in more units of the public good than is 
expected in the stage game equilibrium.  
Our behavioral model predicts the comparative statics that we observe. Groups tend to 
converge to the repeated game equilibria selected by our model. Further support comes from 
the process by which this occurs. In the first half of these treatments, in most groups multiple 
subjects compete by investing heavily in the public good. They then converge to a superstar 
in the second half of the experiment. We believe that our paper is the first to generate 
convergence to stable supergame effects in experimental network games. Finally, our results 
confirm a central prediction of the GG model, that is, that the maximum number of players 
who invest and form the core is independent of group size. 
The results for the endogenous network formation treatments are consistent with the 
hypothesis that players compete for status. There are, however, other possible explanations 
for the results. Bloch and Jackson (2007) argue that an exchange of transfers can lead to 
efficiency gains in repeated network games. Alternatively, core players may feel that it is 
their duty to reciprocate by investing more in the public good if they receive high rents from 
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incoming links. Or, altruism or inequity aversion may motivate them to share some of the 
windfall gains that high status rents bring. Notice that all these alternative mechanisms are 
fundamentally different from a mechanism that is based on selfish players competing for 
status. In particular, our status dynamics predict that endogenous network formation is crucial 
for supergame effects to emerge. In this mechanism, supergame effects are not expected 
when players participate in an exogenously determined network. In contrast, if one of the 
other mechanisms drives the results, the emergence of supergame effects should not depend 
on the way the network is formed. This is the reason why we include two control treatments 
with exogenous networks. 
The results for these controls provide strong support for our conjecture that 
supergame effects are primarily driven by competition for status. We observe many more 
superstars when networks are formed endogenously than when they are exogenously 
imposed. In comparison, the positive role of social motivations is negligible. With exogenous 
networks, only a handful of pro-socially motivated core players contribute more than would 
be expected on the basis of selfishness. We conclude that superstars need status rents; these 
trigger competition between the players, which has a substantial impact on the provision level 
of the public good, and on the shape and stability of the network.  
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. We start with a brief discussion 
of previous studies in Section 2. We present the theoretical framework in Section 3. Section 4 
describes the experimental design and procedures and in Section 5 we provide equilibrium 
and efficiency predictions for the game with the parameters of the experiment. The results of 
the experiment are described in Section 6 and Section 7 concludes. 
 
2 State of the Art 
There is a relatively large theoretical literature on network formation and the provision of 
public goods in networks, either with endogenously formed networks or exogenously given 
networks.
3
 Most relevant for our study is GG (Galeotti and Goyal 2010), who extend the 
network public goods game of Bramoullé and Kranton (2007) by adding endogenous network 
formation using the protocol designed by Bala and Goyal (2000). As mentioned above, we 
employ the GG framework in our experiment. 
                                                        
3 For an overview of the theoretical literature on network formation, see for example Goyal (2007) or Jackson 
(2008). Other theoretical papers that study public good provision on endogenously formed networks include 
Cho (2010) and Cabrales et al. (2011). Galeotti et al. (2010), Boncinelli and Pin (2012) and Bramoullé et al. 
(2014) study public good provision on exogenous networks. 
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 Closest to the current study are two other papers that use the GG-framework in 
laboratory experiments. However, both papers focus on other treatment variables than we do. 
The first is Rong and Houser (2012), who use the best-shot version of the GG-model, i.e. 
players face a binary choice whether or not to invest. Between treatments, they vary the 
strategy set of the players and find that a restricted strategy set yields more equilibrium (star) 
networks. The second is Goyal et al. (2013), who study the effects of varying the costs of 
linking and introducing individual heterogeneity. They find that increasing link costs leads to 
fewer links being made and lower aggregate earnings. Their results, as well as those of the 
baseline treatment in Rong and Houser (2012), line up well with the results in our treatments 
without status rents. In all cases, (equilibrium) core-periphery networks are rarely observed 
and social welfare is low due to the ineffective network structures.  
In our setup, players decide both on their network connections and their investments 
in a (local) public good where investments are strategic complements. These two elements 
have also been studied in isolation. In experiments purely concerned with network formation 
(i.e. players only decide on their links) a typical result is that groups rarely converge to 
equilibrium (star) networks when equilibrium payoffs between different positions are 
asymmetric (Falk and Kosfeld 2012). Introducing heterogeneity in values can reduce payoff 
asymmetries; as a result star networks form more often (Goeree et al. 2009). Other 
experimental studies consider public good games with strategic substitutes, but on fixed 
networks (Rosenkranz and Weitzel 2012; Charness et al. 2014).
4
  
To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to study endogenous network formation 
in combination with public goods investment and status rents. Our introduction and analysis 
of status rents also sheds light on results observed in previous field and laboratory studies. In 
a natural field experiment, Zhang and Zhu (2011) investigate contributions to Chinese 
Wikipedia. They interpret the repeated blockings of Chinese Wikipedia in mainland China as 
an exogenous variation in group size and observe that contributions increase when groups are 
larger. Restivo and van de Rijt (2012) provide an example of how status rents may be 
operationalized in the field. They show that informal rewards („barnstars‟) encourage 
contributors on Wikipedia to increase their contributions. In laboratory experiments, 
providing rankings based on pro-social behavior can positively affect giving in dictator 
games (Duffy and Kornienko 2010). Finally, the positive effect that intergroup competition 
                                                        
4 Other papers that experimentally study public goods on exogenous networks include Fatas et al. (2010), 
Carpenter et al. (2012) and Leibbrandt et al. (2014). Several other experimental papers that investigate games on 
an endogenous network (e.g. Ule, 2005, Corbae and Duffy, 2008, Knigge and Buskens, 2010, Berninghaus et 
al., 2012, Wang et al., 2012) use games that differ substantially from ours. 
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has on cooperation (e.g. Bornstein et al. 1990; Schram and Sonnemans 1996; Nalbantian and 
Schotter 2007; Reuben and Tyran 2010) may also be attributable to intragroup status. 
Aside from status rents, one could interpret the benefits from an incoming link as a 
transfer between players. Transfers (or side payments) can be an effective way to sustain 
otherwise unstable networks (Jackson and Wolinsky 1996; Bloch and Jackson 2007). 
However, our focus is on the competition for links that arise when there are status rents. This 
turns out to be important. Our two control treatments with exogenous networks show that 
transfers per se are insufficient to generate the supergame effects that we observe with 
endogenous networks.  
Finally, there is some related work that supports the approach of our behavioral 
model. Previous theoretical work has studied network formation with forward-looking 
players (Dutta et al. 2005; Herings et al. 2009). In our behavioral model, we assume that 
players are forward-looking with limited foresight. This assumption is supported by 
experimental work on network formation (Callander and Plott 2005; Berninghaus et al. 2012; 
Kirchsteiger et al. 2013; Caldara and McBride 2014). 
 
3 Theory 
3.1 Stage game and static analysis 
We study the one-way flow variant of the static game in GG and extend the model to allow 
players to enjoy status rents for each incoming link. Wherever possible, we follow the 
notation in GG. 
Denote the set of players by           . Every player     simultaneously 
decides on her (public good) investment level    and the links    that she forms. Investments 
are a non-negative integer, i.e. players select their investments from the set   
             )  The vector                    ) specifies the links that   forms, where 
       if   forms a link to   and        if not. Hence, a strategy for player   consists of the 
combination of her public good investment and links and we denote this by          ), and 
i‟s strategy space is denoted by   . The linking decisions of all players jointly define the 
(directed) network architecture              )  and              )  denotes the 
vector of investments. A strategy profile is then denoted by       ). The set of all possible 
strategy profiles is denoted by  . 
 Forming a link to another player   allows   to access  ‟s investment. Let     )     
          denote the set of players that   links to and     )       )  the number of links 
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that   forms. Likewise, we denote the number of links that are formed to   by     )     
         . The total investment that   accesses is then given by       ∑         ) . The 
benefits     ) of accessing units are increasing and concave in   . Note that the investment of 
  and of the players she has linked to are perfect substitutes:   values her own investment the 
same as any investments by any       ).  
Investing in units of the good comes at a constant marginal cost of     per unit and 
making a link comes at a cost    . Players receive status rents     from each incoming 
link. We take    , which ensures that making links has a net cost to society. This results in 
the following payoff function: 
      )      )           )       )  
If we assume self-regarding preferences, a strategy profile    is a strict Nash equilibrium if 
for every player     it holds that 
       
     
 )           
 )        , 
where      
     
 ) is the stage-game payoff of player   given that she chooses   
  and the 
other players choose    
 .  
In any strict Nash equilibrium, a core-periphery network is formed where the players 
in the core invest in the public good and players in the periphery do not invest. The proof of 
this and subsequent results is relegated to Appendix A.
5
 In a core-periphery network, any 
player forms links to all the core players but not to any of the periphery players. In 
equilibrium, the players in the core jointly invest in  ̂ units, defined as the optimal public 
good investment if players would act in isolation. The maximal number of players that can be 
sustained in the core (and invest) is independent of group size and status rents. A special case 
is the Nash star. In this outcome, a single player forms the core and invests in  ̂ units. When 
we refer to „stars‟, we always mean periphery-sponsored stars.  
If   ̂   , the Nash star is always a strict Nash equilibrium, and it is the only type of 
Nash equilibrium in our experiments. The intuition is the following. The marginal benefits of 
the public good exceed the costs of investing up to  ̂ units of the good. This implies that 
every player wants to access at least  ̂ units of the good. Suppose there exists some player   
that invests in  ̂ units. When forming a link is strictly less costly than investing in two units, 
                                                        
5 We only consider the (arguably most interesting) case where   ̂   . If the reverse holds, the unique Nash 
equilibrium is the empty network (i.e. no links are formed) where all players invest in  ̂ units. 
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i.e.   ̂   , the best response of any other player than   would be to link to   and not invest, 
hence a star forms where the core invests and all others free-ride and link to the core. Finally, 
for  , given that no other player is investing, it is optimal to invest in  ̂ units. There are   
such equilibria; one for each player being in the core.  
Note that the rents from incoming links play no role in this intuition. This is why the 
stage-game equilibria are independent of the level of status rents. More formally, given a 
collection of strategies     of all players    , player   will prefer strategy    over   
  if 
(1)      )      
 )          
 )        )       ))        )      
 ))   . 
As the strategies of all other players are fixed, it must be that     )      
 ) and the final 
term on the left hand side of (1) cancels. Then, i‟s decision is independent of the status rents 
  and the set of Nash equilibria must be independent of  . Moreover, as we show in 
Appendix A, the number of players in the core is independent of group size.  
We define social welfare   resulting from a strategy profile   as the sum of all 
individual payoffs, i.e.   )  ∑     )   . A strategy profile   is called efficient if  
     )      )      . 
Based on this definition, the efficient outcome is a star in which the core player invests in 
(weakly) more units than in the Nash star, while the periphery players do not invest. This is 
the case because all players – either in the periphery or the core – benefit from additional 
investments by the core. The efficient investment by the core is denoted by  ̃   ̂  (see 
Appendix A). Note that any investment by the core above  ̃ units will lead to welfare losses. 
In our further analysis, we refer to superstars. We call an outcome a superstar if it is a star 
where the core invests in strictly more units than in the Nash star. Note that efficient 
outcomes are superstars if  ̃   ̂.  
 
3.2 Subgame perfect equilibria 
The finitely repeated game that we study hosts a plethora of equilibria. Appendix D provides 
more details. In Proposition D.1 we show that efficient superstars can be sustained in a 
subgame perfect repeated game equilibrium. Both with and without status rents, efficient 
superstars can be sustained by rotating the core position. Such rotation requires tremendous 
coordination, however, and is unlikely to be observed in laboratory play (e.g. Goeree et al. 
2009; Falk and Kosfeld 2012). Considering only subgame perfect equilibria with fixed 
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positions, Proposition B.2 shows that efficient superstars can be sustained in equilibrium only 
when there are status rents. 
  Although status rents affect the set of repeated-game equilibria, subgame perfection in 
itself provides little guidance which equilibrium, if any, to expect. As argued before, we 
hypothesize that players will compete for attractive network positions. We capture this 
hypothesis in a simple behavioral model, which we use to derive predictions for the 
experimental treatments. 
 
3.3 Competition for status 
Our competition for status dynamic is motivated by the idea that players jockey for a position 
in the periphery or the core, whichever they consider most attractive. As noted before, status 
rents do not affect the set of stage-game equilibria, but they do affect the payoffs of players in 
the core. In any strict Nash equilibrium, the core players earn less than the periphery players 
in the absence of status rents. Introducing status rents increases the payoffs of core players, 
without affecting those in the periphery. The effect on core payoffs depends on group size. 
Hence, status rents and group size jointly determine the relative payoffs between players in 
the periphery and the core.  
Players can use their investment decision to obtain a more attractive position. Note 
that the linking decisions are less useful to jockey for a position than the investment decision. 
The reason is that other players decide with their links whether a player becomes part of the 
periphery or the core. In contrast, the investment decision is entirely at the disposal of the 
individual herself. To capture this difference, we assume that for the investment decision, 
when players form expectations about how play will unfold in the future, they look forward 
with limited foresight. With their linking decisions, players simply choose myopic best 
responses to the current investment profile. To generate predictions of our competition for 
status dynamic, we have to make further, more specific, assumptions. In doing so, we assign 
a lot of weight to simplicity. 
In the model, each period consists of two phases. In the first, one randomly assigned 
player reconsiders her investment in the public good. No other player changes her 
investment. This determines the investments   .
6
 In the second phase of period   every player 
    revises her linking decision      by playing a myopic best response to   . When 
reconsidering their investment, we assume that players are forward looking with limited 
                                                        
6 To enable description and analysis of the dynamics, we add subscript   to all relevant variables from here 
onward. 
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foresight, taking future responses of the other players into account. If a player is selected to 
revise her investment choice, she chooses the level that maximizes her expected payoff in the 
current period   and the immediate next period    , anticipating how others will respond in 
the near future and assuming that her investment decision will be the same in both   and 
   . When imagining how play will unfold for each possible investment level, the player 
assumes that the other players will occasionally revise their investment decisions with limited 
foresight.  
 If some player   updates her investment      at time  , she expects that others will play 
myopic best response with their links in response to her investment      and the investments 
of all other players (which did not change from period    ) . Denote this vector of 
investments at time   by                     )  where                  . That is,   
expects a myopic best response where she, and all other players, choose      such that: 
      (       )      (    
    )      
            .
 7
 
Furthermore,   expects that at     one other player   will consider updating her investment 
       and that   will do so taking the (myopic best response) linking decisions at     of all 
players into account. This implies that   expects that investments at     will be             
for herself,                       and she expects   to choose        such that this 
maximizes  ‟s payoffs at     after all players have played myopic best response with their 
links. 
 A player   who updates her investment evaluates the future payoffs by taking a 
convex combination over the expected payoffs at   (the present) and     (the future):8  
          )                 
This means that when    ,   puts all weight on the immediate expected payoff while     
puts all weight on the future expected payoff. A player may well put relatively more weight 
on the future than on the present (  
 
 
 ). This would reflect the belief that the outcome in 
    will persist. A strategy profile is stable if for all players    : 
                                                        
7 Note that a player‟s myopic best response for her links is independent of the links of other players in our game 
with one-way flow. For some   , there exist multiple best replies in the linking decisions, i.e. when two players 
invest in exactly the same amount. In this case, we assume that players will not change their links, i.e. for player 
  to attract the links that player   has at     she should invest strictly more than  . 
8 To simplify notation, we suppress indicating in the LHS that the evaluation is taking place in period  . 
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     (                )     (       
       )     
          
holds. As the link decisions follow mechanically from the model, we suppress the 
dependence of the expected payoffs on the network architecture. 
 Here, we discuss the conditions under which star networks are stable under the 
behavioral model (the proofs are given in Appendix B). A star network is stable if neither the 
core-player i nor any periphery player j changes her investments when given a chance to 
reconsider her choice.  
Consider first the core-player  . The myopic best response of   is to invest     ̂, 
which yields a Nash star. However, if the sum of status rents is sufficiently low, the core 
position earns less than the periphery and a forward-looking core player may try to move to 
the periphery by choosing     ̂. On the other hand, if the sum of status rents is sufficiently 
large, the core position earns more than the periphery. In this case, a forward-looking core 
player will anticipate that her position may be challenged by one of the periphery players. As 
a result,   considers choosing     ̂  to avoid being challenged. Player   expects to be 
challenged by periphery player   if:  
     (             )     (        )  
With              , all players       will link to   at     and    (             )  
 (      )  (      )      ) . If   does not invest, she will remain in the periphery of 
the star with   in the core and    (        )   (    )   . Using this,   expects that no 
periphery player will challenge when: 
   (    )     (      )  (      )      )   
Rewriting gives: 
(2)      )  (      )    [ (      )   (    )]  
If (2) holds, core player   expects not to be challenged. Note that the RHS of (2) is strictly 
increasing in    for     ̂ , because by construction    (      )   (    )  for 
investments larger than or equal to the Nash quantity  ̂  Denote the lowest value of    for 
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which (2) holds by   .9 This is the lowest investment level at which the core does not expect 
to be challenged. It follows from the LHS of (2) that    is increasing in both   and  , 
provided that   is strictly positive and    . Payoffs for the core and each of the individual 
periphery players are roughly equalized at   .  
We show in Appendix B that the level of status rents and group size determine 
whether star networks are stable, and if so, which investment by the core can be expected. 
When the sum of status rents is sufficiently high, i.e. when the core earns more than the 
periphery in the Nash star,     ̂ holds and the star where the core invests in    units is the 
only stable outcome. Any investment by the core lower than    will make her lose her 
attractive position. As she anticipates this, she will keep her investment at   . If status rents 
are low and the core earns less than the periphery in the Nash star, Nash stars and all 
superstars are unstable. This is because any forward-looking core player will lower her 
investment, expecting that some other player will invest the Nash amount  ̂ in the next period 
if she does so.  
Some of the simplifying assumptions we make are not crucial for the results. For 
instance, when a superstar has emerged and the core player is considering her investment, the 
model assumes she commits to the same investment for two periods. A core player might 
instead consider to first deviate to  ̂ and to invest 0 in the subsequent period, anticipating that 
she will be able to link to another player who takes over the core position. Such an extension 
will not change the predicted outcome. What is necessary for the stability predictions is that 
players converge to a profile in which the core position is (slightly) more attractive than a 
periphery position. This is true under most parameter configurations, among which the 
parameters in our treatments with status rents. As long as the periphery position is less 
attractive than the core, the latter will not want to give up her position for a short-term gain if 
she assigns sufficient value to the future.  
A superstar would only become unstable if the core player could harvest short-term 
gains by free riding, knowing that she could subsequently immediately regain the core 
position with certainty. This involves the strong assumption that other players refrain from 
competing when the attractive core position has become available. Whether or not such a 
destabilizing force will materialize is ultimately an empirical matter to which we will pay 
special attention in the analysis of the experimental results. 
 Our behavioral model also generates predictions for the treatments with exogenous 
                                                        
9 In Appendix B we show that when     ̂ all Nash stars and superstars are unstable if players are sufficiently 
forward-looking. 
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networks. Here, selfish players have no incentive to overinvest to obtain a better position. 
Hence, the dynamics simply predict that the core will invest in the stage-game Nash amount 
 ̂ and that periphery players will not invest.  
 
4 Experimental design and procedures 
In the experiment, subjects play the stage-game described in Section 3 repeatedly for 75 
periods. Across treatments, we systematically vary two parameters: group size   and the level 
of status rents  . Table 1 summarizes this design: we have groups of either 4 or 8 subjects, 
who play the experimental game either with no (   ), medium (    ) or high (  66) 
status rents. In addition, we ran two treatments with high status rents where the links are 
exogenously imposed.  
 In the treatments with endogenous network formation we implement a partners 
design: i.e. subjects are randomly assigned to a group and play the experimental game with 
fixed partners.
10
 These partners are identified by letters ranging from A to D or A to H, 
depending on the group size and the letters refer to the same subject throughout the 
experiment. The number of periods is announced in the experimental instructions (see 
Appendix E). In every period, all subjects simultaneously decide on whom to link to and how 
much to invest. On their decision screen, subjects can review all previous decisions in a 
history box. Once everyone in the session has made a decision, subjects are informed of the 
                                                        
10 This corresponds to many cases in the world outside of the laboratory. For example, on many OSS projects, 
the key contributors remain active over several years (Robles et al., 2005, Crowston et al., 2012). 
TABLE 1: OVERVIEW OF TREATMENTS  
  Endogenous networks  Exogenous networks  
Treatment variable 
𝑛  4 
Small group size 
𝑛  8 
Large group size 
 
𝑛  4 
Small group size 
𝑛  8 
Large group size 
No status 
rents 




































Notes: the first line in a cell lists depicts the treatment acronym (the first part refers to group size and the 
second to the status rents); the lower lines gives the number of groups and subjects in each treatment.  
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resulting outcome and their own payoffs. Examples of key screenshots are provided in 
Appendix F.  
 In the treatments with exogenous linking, everything is the same as in the treatments 
with endogenous linking except that we impose the linking decisions observed in the 
endogenous linking treatments. This means that subjects are informed of the links they will 
form in the current period and only decide on their investment in the public good. In the 
instructions, subjects were informed that subjects could in no way affect the links by their 
decisions. Note that subjects do pay for outgoing links and receive rents for incoming links. 
As with endogenous linking, subjects have access to the history box. Hence, in the treatments 
with exogenous networks, subjects face exactly the same link structures as subjects in the 
corresponding endogenous network treatments. 
 In all treatments, earnings are denoted in „points‟. In addition to a starting capital of 
2000 points, subjects earn points in every period. Total point earnings are exchanged at the 
end of the experiment at a rate of 0.10 euro for every 30 points. Table 2 gives the benefits 
function     ) (in points), as well as the costs of linking,  , the costs of investment   and the 
status rents  . As specified in Section 3, the function     ) is increasing and concave in   , 
and    .  
Sessions were run between May and July 2014 in the CREED laboratory of the 
University of Amsterdam and lasted about two hours. For each treatment with   4, we had 
8 groups in total while for each treatment with   8 we had 6 groups. In total, 320 subjects 
participated in the experiment, each in only one session. We conducted 15 sessions where, 
depending on show-up, the number of subjects per session varied between 12 and 32, but in 
TABLE 2: BENEFIT AND COST PARAMETERS IN THE EXPERIMENT 
Panel a: benefits from accessing the public good 
Units accessed 𝑦𝑖 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 7+  
Benefits 𝑓 𝑦𝑖) 0 92 152 177 196 199 202 203 203+  
Marginal benefits  92 60 25 19 3 3 1 1 
          
Panel b: cost and benefits of investing and linking 
 Status rents 
 None Medium  High 
Cost per unit investment 𝑐 55 55 55 
Cost per link made 𝑘 70 70 70 
Benefit per link received 𝑏 0 22 66 
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most sessions 24 subjects participated. We randomized treatments within a session: in each 
session with endogenous network formation at least two different treatments were conducted. 
Each subject participated in one treatment only. Subjects were recruited from the local 
CREED database, which consists mostly of undergraduate students from various fields. Of 
the subjects in our experiments, 49% are female and 61% were studying at the Amsterdam 
School of Economics or the Amsterdam Business School. Cash earnings were between 5.10 
euro and 125.10 euro, with a mean of 30.63 euro. 
The experiment was computerized using PHP/MySQL and was conducted in English. 
Upon entering the laboratory, subjects were randomly allocated to a separate cubicle. 
Communication was prohibited throughout the session. Before starting the network 
experiment, we elicited risk preferences using a procedure similar to the one of Gneezy and 
Potters (1997). In this procedure, each subject decided how much to invest of a capital of 600 
points. The amount invested was lost or multiplied by 2.5 where each possibility occurred 
with probability 0.5. The result of the investment was then added to the amount not invested. 
Subjects were only informed of the outcome of this part at the very end of the experiment.  
After this, subjects read the instructions of the network game at their own pace, on-
screen. While reading the instructions, a printed summary was handed out. To ensure that all 
subjects understood the instructions, they were required to answer several test questions. The 
experiment did not continue before everyone had answered all questions correctly.
11
  
We ended each session with a short questionnaire after which we privately informed 
subjects of the outcome of the risk elicitation task and their aggregate earnings in the 
experiment. Subjects were privately paid in cash for all periods of the network game and the 
risk-elicitation task. 
 
5 Predictions for the experiment 
In all experimental treatments with endogenous linking, the Nash equilibria of the stage game 
are the same. As argued in subsection 3.1, the
 
set of Nash equilibria is independent of our 
treatment variables; status rents and group size. Figure 1 illustrates these equilibria for the 
parameters of the experiment. In the figure, circles represent the players and the numbers 
inside these circles display their investment. A link is represented by an arrow, which points 
away from the player who makes it. Hence, we see a Nash star, where the core player invests 
in  ̂    units and the other players form links to the core and do not invest. Furthermore, the  
                                                        
11 The experimental instructions and test questions can be found in Appendix E. 
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efficient outcome is also the same across treatments: in all cases it is a superstar where the 
core invests in  ̃  4 units.  
As noted before, status rents and group size do not affect the set of stage-game 
equilibria, but they do affect the payoffs of players in the core.
12
 According to our behavioral 
model, these payoff differences determine whether stars are stable, and therefore affect which 
investment by the core player we can expect.  
Table 3 summarizes the predictions of the behavioral model. To start, note that 
without status rents, we do not expect star networks to be stable. This is because the core 
earns less than the periphery and any forward-looking core player will lower her investment 
to zero, expecting that some other player will invest the Nash amount 2 in the next period. 
This changes when status rents are introduced. In n4b22, we expect stable Nash stars 
to form. With higher status rents or larger groups, we expect competition for the core 
position. More specifically, in treatments n8b22 and n4b66 we expect that competition leads 
to the formation of efficient superstars where the core invests in four units.
 13
 In n8b66, we 
expect that competition for the core position will be so intense that it encourages severe 
overinvestment by the core. Here, we expect the emergence of star networks where the core 
invests in eight units. Note that stable superstars require that i puts sufficient weight on her 
future payoff (e.g. because she expects it to extend beyond the next period), so that she resists 
the temptation to increase her payoff in the current period (by lowering her investment) in 
order to sustain the core position in the future. The final row of Table 3 gives the lower 
bounds for this weight. 
When there are status rents, the stable stars predicted by our behavioral model can 
each be supported as part of a subgame perfect equilibrium. This can be seen by comparing
                                                        
12 In Appendix C, we provide a table with the payoffs in different star networks for our parameters. 
13 For our experiment, we deliberately chose the values of   and   such that we keep     )  -and thus   - 
constant between treatments n8b22 and n4b66. 
FIGURE 1: NASH STAR NETWORKS 
   
Notes: Nash star networks with n=4 and n=8 players 
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the stable outcome    to the subgame perfect equilibria reported in Appendix D. In this way, 
our model provides an equilibrium selection for the supergame. Moreover, the equilibrium 
selected varies across treatments. Note also that the model predicts that no equilibrium will 
be reached in the supergame when there are no status rents. Together, this means that our set 
of treatments provides a powerful test bed for the theory. 
 
6 Results 
We have organized the presentation of the experimental results as follows. In Section 6.1, we 
start with an overview of the outcomes that are observed in our treatments with endogenous 
network formation. We complement this overview with a discussion of cross-treatment 
differences in the provision of the public good. Then we provide an overview of the 
efficiency levels that follow from the networks formed, together with the public good 
provision. In Section 6.2, we study the behavioral dynamics in the experiment and compare 
them to our theoretical predictions. We deal with the question of which treatments trigger a 
competition for status, and we present an analysis of the frequency and stability of the 
outcomes that we observe. Finally, in Section 6.3 we present the results of our exogenous 
network treatments, which allow us to shed light on the motives underlying our results. 
Unless stated otherwise, all tests reported are Mann-Whitney tests (henceforth, MW). 
Throughout, we use two-sided tests using average statistics per group as units of observation. 
 
6.1 Overview: star networks and public good provision 
Figure 2 plots the relative frequency of stars over time. At the start of the experiment, we 
hardly observe any stars in any treatment. Starting around period 10, a clear distinction 
TABLE 3: BEHAVIORAL PREDICTIONS  
 Endogenous networks 
Exogenous 
networks 
 𝑏    𝑏     𝑏  66 𝑏  66 
 𝑛  4 𝑛  8 𝑛  4 𝑛  8 𝑛  4 𝑛  8 𝑛  4 𝑛  8 
𝑦  2 2 2 4 4 8 2 2 
star stable No No Yes Yes Yes Yes n.a. n.a. 
Lower 
bound on 𝛼 
𝛼    33 𝛼    33 𝛼    𝛼    44 𝛼    33 𝛼    6  𝛼    𝛼    
Notes. Columns distinguish between our eight treatments. 𝑦  is defined using eq. (2). The bounds on 𝛼 (the 
weight attributed to future payoffs) denote the values for which the outcome in the two top rows is predicted 
by the model. In Appendix B we derive the bounds. When stable stars are predicted, they constitute a 
subgame perfect equilibrium for the game concerned. 
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emerges between the two treatments without status rents and those with. With status rents, 
the frequency of stars steadily increases over time. In the last 25 periods of these treatments, 
this frequency rises to 76%. In treatment n8b66 stars are even observed in 88% of the last 10 
periods. In stark contrast, there is no clear trend in the occurrence of stars in the treatments 
without status rents. There, such networks remain rare throughout the experiment. 
Table 4 makes these results more precise and tests whether the observed differences 
are significant. The table confirms the picture emerging from Figure 2. Stars form 
substantially and systematically more often in the treatments with status rents than in the 
treatments without. Within these classes of treatments, differences are much smaller and 
mostly insignificant.  
  
FIGURE 2: DEVELOPMENT OF STAR NETWORKS 
  
Notes: Lines show the relative frequencies of periphery-sponsored stars by treatment and period. Lines are 
smoothed by taking the moving average over periods 𝑡  3 to 𝑡  3 for every period 𝑡. 
 
TABLE 4: FREQUENCY OF STAR NETWORKS  
  Relative frequency of periphery-
sponsored stars 
 P-values pairwise MW tests 





All periods Final 25 periods  𝑛  4 𝑛  8 𝑛  4 𝑛  8 𝑛  4 𝑛  8 
𝑏    
𝑛  4 0.09 0.09  -      
𝑛  8 0.07 0.11  0.15 -     
𝑏     
𝑛  4 0.58 0.86  0.00 0.00 -    
𝑛  8 0.50 0.73  0.04 0.02 1.00 -   
𝑏  66 
𝑛  4 0.43 0.53  0.09 0.09 0.32 0.61 -  
𝑛  8 0.58 0.86  0.00 0.01 0.52 0.87 0.56 - 
Notes: the left panels provide the relative frequencies of periphery-sponsored stars in all periods and in the 
final 25 periods. The right panels provide the results of MW tests for the differences in occurrence between 
treatments using the observations in all periods. In Appendix C we provide a table with the p-values for 




Status rents and group size also have profound effects on the provision of the public 
good. To compare investment choices while holding network composition constant, we focus 
on the investment of core players in periods where stars were formed. The results are 
presented in Table 5. This table shows that, conditional on a star being formed, public good 
provision is inefficiently low (that is, below four units) in the treatments without rents and the 
treatment with medium rents and small group size. In treatments n4b66 and n8b22 public 
good provision is close to the efficient level of four units. In treatment n8b66 the core player 
vastly overinvests with an average contribution level that is close to double the efficient 
amount. With status rents, any increase in group size or status rents leads to higher 
investment by core players. The sizable differences between treatments are all significant, 
except for the comparisons between n4b0 and n8b0 and between n8b22 and n4b66. By and 
large, the average and median investment levels accord very well with the predictions of the 
behavioral model. 
 Investments in the public good are one of the factors that affect efficiency in this 
environment. The other is the links made to access the public good. We now consider both 
factors simultaneously by looking at treatment differences in observed efficiency. Table 6 
shows the relative frequency of efficient star networks (where the core invests in 4 units), 
mean earnings and mean earnings net of status rents per treatment. 
Efficient star networks are almost exclusively observed in n8b22 and n4b66. As noted 
before (cf. Table 4), stars rarely form at all without status rents. In n4b22, stars are formed 
TABLE 5: INVESTMENT BY CORE PLAYERS IN STAR NETWORKS 
  Investment in public good  
(all periods) 
 P-values pairwise MW tests 





Predicted Mean (s.e.) Median  𝑛  4 𝑛  8 𝑛  4 𝑛  8 𝑛  4 𝑛  8 
𝑏    
𝑛  4 - 1.83 (0.11) 2  -      
𝑛  8 - 1.82 (0.09) 2  0.92 -     
𝑏     
𝑛  4 2 2.22 (0.06) 2  0.01 0.02 -    
𝑛  8 4 3.49 (0.33) 4  0.01 0.03 0.03 -   
𝑏  66 
𝑛  4 4 3.61 (0.18) 3.5  0.00 0.02 0.00 0.75 -  
𝑛  8 8 7.07 (0.45) 7.5  0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 - 
Notes: The left panel lists the predicted, mean and median investment in the public good by core players, 
conditional on a periphery-sponsored star being formed. The predicted investment is equal to 𝑦 , except in 
the treatments without status rents, where no stable star is predicted. Standard errors of the mean are 
presented in parentheses, based on mean investments per group. The median is obtained by taking the 
median within each group first and then the median of these numbers per treatment. The right panel presents 
p-values for tests whether mean core investments differ between treatments, conditional on a periphery-
sponsored star having formed.  
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but investments by the core are typically lower than the social optimum (cf. Table 5). In 
n8b66, we also frequently observe stars but here the core vastly overcontributes. As for 
earnings, as expected, these increase as status rents rise. We correct for this effect of adding 
money to the system by deducting the status rents from the earnings. This yields a clear 
difference between the treatments with and without status rents. The treatments without status 
rents perform particularly badly in terms of (net) earnings. Here subjects do not benefit from 
interacting with others and actually do worse than if they had completely refrained from 
making links and simply investing in two units themselves.
14
 This mirrors previous 
experimental results reported in the literature on endogenous network formation without 
status rents (e.g., Falk and Kosfeld, 2012). Net earnings are much higher when there are 
status rents. In pairwise comparisons, either of the treatments without status rents reaches 
significantly lower net earnings than any of the treatments with status rents (all p<0.05). Net 
earnings are the highest in treatment n8b22. This is also the treatment where we observe 
efficient 4-stars the most frequently. Net earnings are higher in this treatment than in all other 
treatments (p<0.10 for all pairwise comparisons). 
Next, we turn to the convergence of our data across periods. Figure 3 displays for 
each treatment the proportion of groups that converge to a stable outcome. If a group 
converges, it is almost always to a star network.
15
 Without status rents groups almost never 
                                                        
14 In this case, a player earns 42 points. 
15 In treatment n4b66 two groups converged to networks where multiple players invest. In treatment n8b22, one 
group converged to a situation where 6 out of 8 players formed a periphery-sponsored star, where the core 




p-values pairwise MW tests  
for net earnings 











 𝑛  4 𝑛  8 𝑛  4 𝑛  8 𝑛  4 𝑛  8 
𝑏    
𝑛  4 0.00 33.4 (3.0) 33.4 (3.0)  - 
𝑛  8 0.00 38.9 (1.9) 38.9 (1.9)  0.12 - 
𝑏     
𝑛  4 0.01 75.9 (2.0) 60.9 (2.0)  0.00 0.00 - 
𝑛  8 0.36 99.9 (4.2) 81.6 (3.9)  0.00 0.00 0.00 - 
𝑏  66 
𝑛  4 0.29 106.1 (6.4) 59.7 (6.6)  0.01 0.03 0.92 0.05 - 
𝑛  8 0.00 124.6 (7.4) 67.9 (6.5)  0.00 0.01 0.16 0.08 0.30 - 
Notes: The first column gives the relative frequency of efficient outcomes. The efficient outcome is a 
periphery-sponsored star where the core invests in four units and no periphery player invests. Mean earnings 
are denoted per subject in points per period. For mean net earnings we subtract the status rents. Standard 
errors of the means are computed using each group as an individual observation. The panels on the right give 
p-values for tests whether mean net earnings differ between treatments.  
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converge to any stable outcome, independent of group size.
16
 When there are status rents, 
group size and status rents have a beneficial effect on the provision of the public good. With 
medium status rents and small groups, groups usually converge to a star network in which the 
core player consistently invests the stage game Nash amount of two units.
17
 When group size 
is doubled in treatment n8b22, all groups converge to a stable network. The most frequently 
observed end-point of the dynamics is a superstar in which the core player invests the 
efficient amount of four units. Similarly, with high status rents, investments are higher in 
large groups than in small groups. In fact, in this case all large groups converge to a star 
network in which the core player overinvests in the public good. In this treatment, the large 
majority of groups converge to superstar networks in which the core invests in seven or eight 
units, which is on average almost double the efficient investment of four units. 
 These results agree well with the predictions of the behavioral model. In accordance 
with this model, stable Nash stars (where the core invests in two units) should only be 
observed in treatment n4b22 and the occurrence of large overinvestments should be limited to 
treatment n8b66 (cf. Table 3). Of particular interest is the comparison of treatments n4b66 
and n8b22. These treatments allow us to investigate whether the earnings for the player in the 
                                                                                                                                                                            
invested in 3 units and the periphery did not invest. Between the other two players, one player invested and the 
other did not and the latter formed a link to the former.  
16 Moreover, we do not observe any successful rotation of the core position in our experiments.  
17 In this treatment (n4b22), the only two groups that are not classified as stable, also formed periphery-
sponsored stars with a fixed core for a substantial number of periods where the core alternated between 
investing two and three units. 
FIGURE 3: PROPORTION OF GROUPS CONVERGING AND END-POINT OF THE DYNAMICS  
 
Notes: A group converges to a network if all players repeat decisions at least 5 times. Most groups converge 
to „x-star‟ outcomes, periphery-sponsored stars in which the core player invests in x units of the public good. 
Most groups converge only once: only 4 of the 42 groups converged to two or more different networks. In 
these cases, we include the last stable network. 
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core relative to the players in the periphery is essential for the results. Only when the core 
earns more, does our behavioral model predict that there will be competition for this position. 
According to the model, a periphery player has the same incentive to challenge the core in 
either of these two treatments; the model assumes that with a slightly higher investment than 
the core player a challenger will attract     links. In either treatment this yields a total 
benefit of 132 points (2x66=132; 6x22=132). In agreement with the model, the data of these 
two treatments are quite similar. We observe slightly more superstars in n8b22, but the 
difference is not significant (p=0.60). This result allows us to better understand the group size 
effect noted above. It does not matter for our subjects if a rise in potential status rents is 
created by an increase in potential linkers or by an increase in rents per linker. In agreement 
with the behavioral model, they compete for the core position to the same extent in both 
cases. 
 
6.2 Behavioral dynamics in the experiment 
The key element of our behavioral model is that players compete for the core position if 
status rents make it more attractive than a periphery position. Without such rents, players 
prefer that others fulfill the costly job of providing the public good to the group. Indeed, our 
data show that subjects (only) compete for the core position in the treatments where we 
expect them to do so. Here, we focus on the competition itself. 
Figure 4 shows how the distribution of competitors for the core position develops 
over time in our treatments with endogenous network formation. Without status rents, there 
are basically no subjects who consistently invest in more than two units of the good. In 
FIGURE 4: NUMBER OF COMPETITORS OVER TIME  
 
Notes: For each treatment, the distribution of the number of players investing in more than two units is 
displayed, both for the first 25 periods (top row) and for the final 25 periods (bottom row).  
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treatment n4b22 the core position in a Nash star is slightly more attractive than a periphery 
position, but not enough to support a superstar where the core consistently invests in three 
units or more. In agreement with this observation, we see few investments above two units 
and very rarely observe that multiple players invest at the same time. Clearer competition is 
observed in treatments n4b66 and n8b22 where the efficient superstar is predicted to emerge. 
In the first 25 periods, we frequently observe multiple players who invest in more than two 
units and compete for the core position (in 54% and 21% of the observations in n8b22 and 
n4b66 respectively). In the final 25 periods, the dust settles and typically only one 
overinvesting player remains. Very fierce competition is observed in our treatment n8b66. In 
the first 25 periods, we observe up to five players who simultaneously invest in more than 
two units. In all cases at least one player overinvests and in the majority of observations 
multiple players compete for the core position. The competition diminishes towards the end, 
and in the final 25 periods a single surviving player manages to deter the competition. 
 More details on how subjects compete are offered in Figure 5, which shows the top 
three investment levels per group over time. In the treatments without status rents, there are 
usually two or three subjects investing two units. This finding illustrates that in these 
treatments subjects are not able to coordinate on a fixed star network. The picture is different 
in treatment n4b22, where after some time on average only one subject consistently invests 
two units and a stable star network is formed. In treatments n4b66 and n8b22 we observe 
higher investments by the top contributor than in n4b22: the subject in the core learns that an 
efficient level of four units is needed to prevent being challenged by periphery players. Once 
FIGURE 5: RANKED MEAN INVESTMENTS  
 
Notes: For each treatment the average investments are displayed as a function of time. The top 
(middle/bottom) line presents the average highest (second/third highest) investment level in the group. Lines 
are smoothed by taking the moving average over periods 𝑡  3 to 𝑡  3 for every period t. 
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it has become clear who is the superstar in a group, the investments by the other group 
members gradually fade out.
18
  
The most interesting dynamics are observed in treatment n8b66. At the start of the 
experiment, the mean investments for the second highest contributor are almost as sizable as 
for the top contributor: on average they invest in 4.00 units in the first 25 periods. Only after 
a while does this runner up start to give up. To further investigate what is going on in this 
treatment, Figure 6 provides a more detailed view. Here, we show the top-3 investments 
across periods in each of the six groups in n8b66.
19
 In all groups, we see that in early periods 
at least two players compete for the core position by investing in very high amounts. At some 
point all but one player give in and a superstar forms with a core player who (over)invests in 
7 or 8 units. At these levels, payoffs are to a large extent equalized and periphery players stop 
challenging the core player. 
  To investigate the stability of the decisions made, Table 7 shows the frequency of 
various stars and how often they were repeated, after having been formed. The outcomes 
predicted by our behavioral model are listed in bold. In agreement with this model, star 
networks occur only sporadically in the treatments without status rents, and if they occur, 
they tend to be unstable. In n4b22, the predicted 2-star is the most frequently observed and 
also most stable outcome. In treatments n4b66 and n8b22, the efficient 4-star is predicted to 
                                                        
18 In a regression, we find a negative correlation between risk aversion and being in the core of a star in 
treatments where we expect competition (i.e. when networks are formed endogenously and    ). We find no 
significant correlation between risk aversion and core positions in the other treatments. Moreover, we do not 
find any relation between gender and network positions. Similar results are obtained when we use public good 
investments as the dependent variable. More details are available upon request.  
19 A similar figure of the other treatments is available upon request. 
FIGURE 6: RANKED INVESTMENTS IN N8B66 
 
Notes: For each group in treatment n8b66 the top-3 highest investments in the group are displayed over time. 




occur, and indeed it is most often observed in both treatments. In these treatments the 
efficient star is very stable. If it is formed, it remains unchanged in 90% of the cases. Finally 
in n8b66 a star network is predicted in which the superstar invests in 8 units. Here, in the 
experiment most often superstars are observed where the core invests in 7 or 8 units, and 
these outcomes are again remarkably stable. In 88% of the cases that such a superstar is 
formed, it is exactly repeated in the next period.  
Finally, we investigate what happens if a core player in a   -star deviates by lowering 
her investment. As already noted,   -stars are very stable: core players rarely lower their 
investments: of the 319   -stars that are formed up to period 65, only 12 core players deviate 
by lowering their investment.
20
 This strongly suggest that subjects anticipate that lowering 
their investment is costly, as they could be challenged and lose the attractive core position. 
Given the small number of core players who deviate, it is hard to make strong claims about 
the resulting payoffs, but still we illustrate what subjects might expect in Figure 7. Here we 
plot the normalized earnings of core players in   -stars and we split them by whether they 
lower their investment (at period    ) or not. As expected, the core players who lower their 
investment earn a higher immediate payoff (at period    ), but on average pay the price in 
                                                        
20 We focus on treatments where     ̂, to ensure that core-players can deviate by lowering their investment. 
TABLE 7: FREQUENCY OF PERIPHERY-SPONSORED STARS AND THEIR STABILITY 
 𝑏    𝑏     𝑏  66 
 𝑛  4 𝑛  8 𝑛  4 𝑛  8 𝑛  4 𝑛  8 
0-star 5 (0.00) 3 (0.00)     
1-star 6 (0.00) 2 (0.00) 2 (0.00)    
2-star 43 (0.21) 28 (0.52) 268 (0.66) 1 (0.00) 9 (0.56)  
3-star 1 (0.00)  67 (0.25) 67 (0.82) 59 (0.68)  
4-star   8 (0.38) 151 (0.85) 172 (0.94)  
5-star    7 (0.00) 15 (0.60) 47 (0.81) 
6-star    1 (0.00)  9 (0.33) 
7-star     1 (0.00) 108 (0.92) 
8-star      91 (0.85) 
9-star      2 (0.50) 
10-star      2 (0.00) 
Other networks 545 (0.03) 417 (0.00) 255 (0.21) 223 (0.21) 344 (0.38) 191 (0.01) 
Groups 8 6 8 6 8 6 
Observations 600 450 600 450 600 450 
Notes: Cells denote the frequency of the outcomes denoted in the first column across all periods. The 
proportion of periods that exactly the same strategy profile is played in the subsequent period is given in 
parentheses. Entries in bold denote the outcomes that are predicted to be stable by our behavioral model. 
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subsequent periods. These losses outweigh the short-term gains: the aggregated (normalized) 
losses in periods     to      are roughly 7 times the size of the normalized gains at 
   . 
 
6.3 Motives underlying investments to the public good 
The evidence presented so far is consistent with the explanation based on competition for 
status. Once the core position becomes more attractive than the periphery position because of 
the status rents that it generates, subjects start competing for it. To prevent being challenged, 
star players are forced to invest to such an extent that the payoffs across positions are 
approximately equalized. However, we cannot exclude that the results are driven by social 
motives. For instance, subjects may be inequity averse, and therefore choose higher 
investments to compensate others for the gains that status rents bring. Inequity aversion may 
also explain why subjects prefer to avoid the core position if it is relatively unattractive in the 
absence of status rents. Another possibility is that core players feel that they have to return 
the favor if they receive status rents, or that they are simply driven by altruism and prefer to 
give something to others when they become richer. To distinguish between the competition 
for status dynamics and the possibility that the subjects are driven by social motives, we 
included the two treatments in which we impose the networks that were naturally formed in 
the corresponding treatments with endogenous network formation. If the competition for 
status dynamics drive the results, we should not observe higher investments in these control 
treatments than the individually rational number of two units. If on the other hand, the results 
are driven by social motives, we should not observe any difference with the corresponding 
endogenous network treatments.  
FIGURE 7: PAYOFFS FROM LOWERING INVESTMENTS AS A CORE PLAYER 
  
Notes: Mean payoffs of core players in 𝑦 -stars. Earnings are normalized by normalizing the payoff in 𝑦 -
star that is formed at 𝑡     to 0. The figure is based on 𝑦 -stars where 𝑦  ?̂?, to ensure that core-players 





Table 8 displays the mean, median and predicted public good investments by core 
players in star networks in the exogenous treatments, together with the benchmarks provided 
by the endogenous treatments. The results provide convincing support for the competition for 
status dynamics. The results are particularly strong for the case where group size is small and 
status rents are large; here, the mean and the median are exactly at two units as predicted. 
Even more so, there are almost no cases where the core player invests in more than two units 
of the public good. But also in the case with large group size and large status rents, the results 
are striking: average investment is only a fraction of the level that is achieved when networks 
are endogenously formed. The differences between the investments in the endogenous and 
exogenous network treatments are significant at the 5% level. 
 Figure 8 shows the distribution of investment choices by core players for each of the 
treatments with   66, both for endogenous and exogenous networks. It is clear that with 
TABLE 8: MEAN CORE-INVESTMENTS IN EXOGENOUS AND ENDOGENOUS NETWORKS 
  Exogenous networks  Endogenous networks   
  Predicted Mean (s.e.) Median  Predicted Mean (s.e.) Median  p-value 
𝑛  4  2 2.00 (0.05) 2  4 3.61 (0.18) 3.5  0.028 
𝑛  8  2 2.85 (0.41) 2  8 7.07 (0.45) 7.5  0.028 
Notes: The table lists the predicted, mean and median investments by core players in the public good, 
conditional on a periphery-sponsored star being formed. Standard errors of the mean are presented in 
parentheses, based on taking the mean of the mean investments per group. The median is obtained by taking 
the median within each group first and then the median within each treatment. The p-values come from 2-
sided Wilcoxon signed-ranks tests, where we test the null-hypothesis that investments by the core are the 
same across treatments, conditional on a periphery-sponsored star having formed. Each pair of endogenous 
and exogenous groups constitutes one individual observation. 
 
FIGURE 8: DISTRIBUTION OF CORE-INVESTMENTS IN ENDOGENOUS AND EXOGENOUS 
NETWORKS 
 
Notes: The figure shows the distributions of investment of core players in treatments with 𝑏  66 , 
conditional on a periphery-sponsored star having formed. All period/group observations are included. 
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exogenous networks, core players invest substantially less than with endogenous networks. In 
both n4b66EXO and n8b66EXO, in periphery-sponsored stars the modal core investment in 
the stage-game Nash amount is two units, while we hardly ever observe such low investments 
with endogenous networks. In n8b66EXO, we do observe some cases where core players 
invest in more than two units, but these only account for a small number of cases. These 




We have investigated the effectiveness of a novel behavioral mechanism to generate 
supergame effects in an environment where players decide both on the network structure and 
on their contributions to a local public good. For this, we introduced status rents for incoming 
links to the endogenous network formation game of Galeotti and Goyal (2010). Our 
conjecture was that for a player to emerge as the winner of the competition for status, she 
would be forced to take the interests of the other group members into account. To structure 
the interaction, we derived sets of subgame perfect equilibria for distinct parameterizations of 
the game. We also developed a dynamic behavioral model that predicts when a subgame 
perfect equilibrium outcome is to be expected, and which equilibrium is selected. We 
subsequently tested these predictions in a laboratory experiment, where we varied group size 
and status rents across treatments. These are two factors that should systematically affect the 
equilibrium that is selected if people compete for status. Thereby, these factors determine the 
extent to which the public good is provided and the shape and stability of the outcome. 
We find that the presence of status rents is crucial for the results. With status rents, 
subjects start by jockeying for the core position. Once the dust has settled and subjects have 
implicitly agreed on who will be in the core of the network, a stable outcome arises in which 
the core player consistently contributes an amount that roughly equalizes payoffs across 
positions. For specific environments, this entails contributing more than the stage-game Nash 
quantity and in some even more than what is efficient. In this way, the core player in a 
superstar prevents being challenged by the others, and periphery players maintain their links, 
which the superstar-core needs for her exemplary behavior. Across treatments, we observe 
that these supergame effects –i.e., the adjustment of contributions aimed at maintaining the 
network (core) position– increase with the size of the status rents and with group size. In 
stark contrast, inefficiency reigns and groups rarely converge to equilibria when there are no 
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status rents. These experimental results correspond closely to the predictions of the 
competition for status dynamic and the selection of a subgame perfect equilibrium (if any) 
that it entails.  
With the help of our two control treatments in which we imposed exogenous 
networks, we excluded other motivations that might explain our results. In agreement with 
our conjecture that the results are driven by competition for status among selfish players, the 
observed supergame effects largely disappear when the possibility to compete for the core 
position is excluded by design. Instead, if our core players in superstars had been driven by 
other motivations, like exchange of favors, altruism or inequity aversion, results should have 
been independent of how the positions in the network are assigned.  
We therefore conclude that free competition for a favorable position is the key 
ingredient for the emergence of superstars in our environment. Beyond the specific setting of 
our experiment, this may help explain why so often a small minority in a group contributes so 
heavily to a public good. There is no need to assume that pure altruism or other pro-social 
motivations drive this behavior. Even purely self-interested individuals may do so if they care 
enough about the status rents that are closely linked to being at the core of the group in this 
way. In short, volunteers at sports teams, workshop organizers and OSS developers all 
contribute much more to their group than can be expected in a one-shot environment because 
the supergame they are involved in allows them to collect status rents from the central 
position that they have.  
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Appendix A: Stage-game equilibria and efficient outcomes 
 
This appendix is greatly indebted to the analysis in Galeotti and Goyal (2010). In agreement 
with the theoretical literature on network formation, we will restrict our attention to pure-
strategy equilibria. 
 
Some additional notation 
Most of the notation is introduced in section 3 of the main text, but for the proofs we will use 
the following additional definitions. The marginal benefit of accessing the 
th
 unit of the 
good is given by    )     )       ).  
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A network is a core-periphery network if there are two sets of players  ̂  and  ̂  for 
which it holds that     )   ̂           ̂  and     )   ̂       ̂ . In such a network, 
the players in  ̂  form the core and  ̂  form the periphery. All core players form links to the 
other core players, but not to the periphery players and any periphery player links to all the 
core players but to none of the other periphery players. A core-periphery network with a 
single player in the core is called a star network. 
 
Nash equilibria of the stage game 
We start by stating our variant of Lemma 1 in Galeotti and Goyal (2010): 
 
Lemma A.1 In any Nash equilibrium   , all players     access at least  ̂ units of the 
good,   
   ̂, and all players who acquire units personally will access exactly  ̂ units of the 
good, i.e. if   
    then   
   ̂. 
 
Proof. Suppose that a player     accesses fewer than  ̂ units of the good, i.e.     ̂. If this 
is the case   can strictly increase her payoff by investing as the marginal benefits strictly 
exceed the marginal costs for    ̂ , i.e.    )        ̂. If a player   invests in units 
personally, i.e.     , and she accesses more than  ̂  units of the good,     ̂ , she can 
strictly increase her payoff by lowering    as    )        ̂. 
 
Next, we can state our version of Galeotti and Goyal‟s Proposition 2. 
 
Proposition A.1 In any strict Nash equilibrium   , (i) a core-periphery network is formed 
where (ii) the core players all invest, (iii) the periphery players do not invest, (iv) aggregate 
investment equals  ̂ units and (v) the maximum number of players in the core is independent 





Proof. We start by showing that in every strict Nash equilibrium   , ∑   
 
     ̂ should 
hold. It is easy to see that by Lemma A.1, it must be that aggregate investment in    equals at 
least  ̂  units, i.e. ∑   
 
     ̂ . We define the set of all players with incoming links by 
 ̂           and all players without incoming links by  ̂          . Note that in a 
strict equilibrium, any player    ̂  should invest in strictly more units than any player 
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   ̂ . If not, players that link to   could (weakly) improve by moving their links to  . Also, 
   
    should hold for all    ̂ , as otherwise no player would link to   (but rather invest 




      ̂ . Note that ∑   
 
   ̂ 
  ̂ cannot hold, as then for every 
   ̂ ,   
   ̂ follows and this contradicts Lemma A.1. We will now show that ∑   
 
   ̂ 
 
 ̂ cannot hold in a strict equilibrium. Assume that it holds. This implies that any    ̂  does 
not link to all other players in    as otherwise   
   ̂ follows which contradicts Lemma A.1. 
Hence, for every    ̂ , there exists some      ̂ , for whom       . Without loss of 
generality we can order the players in  ̂ such that   
    




 holds. As we are 
considering strict equilibria, this means that no    ̂ will link to the last player  in the 
sequence, as otherwise   could (weakly) improve by linking to someone higher in the 
sequence. Aggregate investment by all players    ̂      should still be at least  ̂ units, as 
by Lemma 1   
   ̂      ̂  should hold. This means that there exists some subset 
 ̂ 
   ̂     , whose investments add up exactly to  ̂ : ∑   
 
    
   ̂ . Take the smallest 
possible subset  ̂ 
  for which ∑   
 
   ̂ 




      ̂ , player  could 
strictly improve by not investing and linking to all    ̂ 
 . This contradicts  being in  ̂ in 
an equilibrium. Hence, it cannot be that ∑   
 
   ̂ 
  ̂ and it follows that ∑   
 
   ̂ 
  ̂. 
If ∑   
 
   ̂ 
  ̂, this implies that any    ̂  will have   
   , as they can access  ̂ 
units (at lower costs than investing personally) by linking to all    ̂ . Thus aggregate 
investment equals  ̂ and    must be a core-periphery network where all players    ̂  form 




      ̂  holds. As 
∑   
 
     ̂, this provides an upper bound for the number of players that invest personally, 






In any efficient outcome, it must be that aggregate investment is at least  ̂  units, i.e. 
∑        ̂. If not, all players will access fewer than  ̂ units and they can strictly increase 
their payoff (and hence the sum of payoffs) by investing in additional units as    )  
      ̂. As   ̂   , the aggregate costs of accessing at least  ̂ units of the good are 
minimized by forming a periphery-sponsored star where only the core invests, i.e.    
 ̂                                      . The efficient level of investment 
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    ̃ by the core is such that the sum of all marginal benefits just exceeds the marginal 
costs of investing. That is,  ̃ is set such that it satisfies      ̃)    and      ̃   )   . 
 
Appendix B: Dynamic stability 
Here we discuss the dynamic properties of our behavioral model. For the analysis, we make 
two simplifying assumptions.  
 
Assumption 1: The benefit function is sufficiently concave:    (    )     ) if    ̂ 
and     ;    )    and    )   . 
Assumption 1 lists a requirement on the concavity of    ) that ensures that no player will link 
to multiple players if there exists some player that invested in at least  ̂. In addition, it says 
that there is no public good without investments and that the benefits associated with access 
to one unit exceed the costs of linking.  
 
Assumption 2:      ̂)   (
 
 
 ̂).  
Assumption 2 provides a condition on the linking costs that prevents networks with multiple 
hubs being formed in equilibrium. We note that the parameterization in our experiment 
fulfills Assumptions 1 and 2.  
 
Proposition B.1: The behavioral model generates the following predictions: 
(i) When status rents are sufficiently high, i.e. when the player in the core of the Nash 
star earns more than a player in the periphery, there exists a lower bound on   above 
which the only stable outcomes are periphery-sponsored stars where the core player 
invests    units and no periphery player invests. 
(ii) When status rents are low or absent, i.e. when in the Nash star the core player earns 
less than a player in the periphery, there exists a lower bound on   above which all 
Nash stars and superstars are unstable. 
 
Proof. We first derive the decisions of the core players in periphery-sponsored stars. We do 
this for two separate cases. In case I, we consider the case where status rents are relatively 
high, i.e. when      and, in case II, we look at the decisions of core players when the 
reverse holds. Then, we derive the conditions under which periphery players in a periphery-
sponsored star leave their investments unchanged.  
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Core player case I:      
First, we show that if no other player     invests at    , then if core player   is given the 
chance to revise her choice, she will choose       
 . This rules out all other periphery-
sponsored stars (where the periphery does not invest) than the   -star as stable outcomes.  
Consider the situation where core player   is given the chance to change her 
investment. At    , none of the other players invested, i.e.               . For 
expositional reasons, we suppress that all expected payoffs below are conditional on the 
investments of others at  . For the   -star to be stable,    (      
 )     (     
    
 )       
     must hold. This implies that 
(B.1)     (      
 )      )     (         
 )          (         
 )       
    , 
should hold. If   invests in    units, she expects to be in the core of the   -star at   and    . 
Her expected payoff is then    (      
 )      )          ) , for which we simply 
write    (      
 )    
 . Below, we will show that any other investment     
     will 
lead to lower expected payoffs at    , i.e.   
         (         
 )       
    . Then, 
expected payoffs can only be higher if there exists a profitable deviation in the current period, 
i.e. when      (         
 )    
 . In this case, (B.1) holds when: 
(B.2)     
     (         
 )   
 
     (         
 )        (         
 )
       
          (         
 )    
   
Note that in this case,      (         
 )    
         (         
 ) and there exists a lower 
bound  ̅      ) for which (B.2) holds. Hence, if   is sufficiently forward looking (   ̅), 
she will choose       
 . 
Now we will show that   
         (         
 )       
     is indeed true. When   
invests in more than    units, she expects not to be challenged at    , but she will earn a 
strictly lower payoff than in the   -superstar in both periods.21 Hence, profitable deviations 
can only follow from lower investments than   . If       
 ,   expects to be challenged at 
   , i.e. there will be some player   who she expects will invest             ̂         
                                                        
21 Remember that for values above  ̂, the marginal benefits of investing are strictly lower than the marginal 
costs. 
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and no player will link to   at    . At    ,   could either link to   or not. (i) If she does not 
link to   (or any other player), her expected payoff at     will be        (         
 ))  
 (    )       . Note that this payoff is maximal for       ̂, but that even in this case it is 
strictly smaller than the payoff of a periphery player in a Nash star:   
     ̂)   . The 
payoff of a periphery player in the   -star (  
      )   ) is strictly larger than   
  as 
    ̂ . When   
    
 , this implies   
    
    
         (         
 )) ; hence, 
investing       
  leads to lower expected payoffs at     than investing       
 .   
    
  
is true in most cases, among which all of our experimental treatments.
22
 (ii) If   does link to  , 
her expected payoff at     is given by:        (         
 ))   (           )        
 . Given that             ̂        , this expected payoff must be strictly smaller than   
 , 
and therefore it must also be strictly smaller than   
 . Again, if   
    
  this implies that any 
investment       
  will lead to lower expected payoffs at    . All in all,        (     
  )         (         
 )       
    . 
 
Core player case II:     ̂ 
We will show that in this case superstars will not form and Nash stars are stable for all values 
of   when the core in the Nash star earns more than the periphery in the Nash star. This is the 
case when     )    ̂   . When the reverse holds, there exists a lower bound on   
above which Nash stars must be unstable. 
If   invests in the stage game Nash amount or more, i.e.       ̂, she expects not to be 
challenged as     ̂. Note that in this case    (      ̂)     (      ̂), which implies 
that superstars will not be formed when     ̂. If   chooses       ̂, a Nash star is expected 
to result at both   and     and   will be in the core and her expected payoffs are   
 .  
For a Nash star to be stable,    (      ̂)     (         
 )        
   ̂  should 
hold. We just established that   will not invest more than  ̂, but she may want to invest less 
than  ̂  in order to induce others to invest. First note that the expected payoffs at   are 
maximized by investing       ̂. If   invests less, she earns a strictly lower payoff at   as no 
other invests, and she will access fewer than  ̂ units. Hence, any profitable deviation should 
arise from higher expected payoffs at    , i.e. a Nash star is stable when: 
                                                        
22 If   
    
 , the core could potentially earn a higher payoff by investing less than   . If this is the case, the 
behavioral model predicts that competition would push investments up to   , but that the   -star will be 
unstable. 
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(B.3)      
  
       (         
 )
       (         
 )      (         
 )
       
   ̂  
Note that both the denominator and the numerator are strictly positive, as   
       (     
    
 ) and the only relevant cases are those for which        (         
 )       (         
 ) 
holds. Consider that   invests       ̂. At    , if some other player   updates, there are four 
possible outcomes: (1)   invests         ̂       and links to  , and   links to  ; (2)   invests 
        ̂       and links to   (and   does not link to  ); (3)   invests         ̂ and   does 
not link to   and   does not link to  ; or (4)   invests         ̂ and   does not link to   but   
does link to  . The expected payoffs for   in outcomes   ), (2) and (3) are strictly lower than 
  
 , which means that the RHS in (B.3) is strictly larger than one. Hence, the only possible 
restriction on   comes from the situations described in outcome (4). In these situations, 
       (         ̂))   ( ̂      )         , which is maximized when        and in 
this case        (      )    
 . When   does not invest, she expects      (      )    
and (B.3) yields: 




   
When status rents are absent or low, the core earns less than the periphery in a Nash star, i.e. 
  
    
 . This is the case when     )    ̂   . It follows from (B.4) that Nash stars are 
unstable if players are sufficiently forward looking.  
The core also earns less than the periphery in a Nash star (and Nash stars are unstable 
for sufficiently forward-looking players) when     ̂ . Suppose this is not the case and 
    ̂  and   
    
  both hold.   
    
  implies that    ̂)    ̂      )     ̂)   , 
or: 
(B.5)     
  ̂  
   
  
Recall that the core player expects that she will not be challenged when she invests     ̂. A 
periphery player   will not challenge the core   when investing     ̂   
  and linking to   
leads to a strictly higher payoff than investing     ̂. This means, that    ̂)    ̂   
 )  
      ̂)    ̂      )  should hold. Rewriting gives: 
(B.6)     
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However, (B.5) and (B.6) cannot simultaneously hold as the RHS in (B.5) is strictly larger 
than the RHS in (B.6) for     ̂. Hence,     ̂ implies   
    
  and in this case all Nash 
stars and superstars are unstable if players are sufficiently forward looking. 
If status rents are relatively high, the core earns more than the periphery in a Nash 
star, i.e.   
    
  (i.e. when     )    ̂   ). Hence, if     ̂ and   
    
 , the core 
in a Nash star will not change her investment and Nash stars may be stable. 
 
Periphery players (cases I and II) 
We have now derived the investment level of core players. That is, when   
    
  the core 
player will invest in       
  units. For the corresponding Nash star or superstar to be stable, 
a periphery player     should not want to challenge the core player  . Consider a periphery 
player  . If   sticks to investing       , she expects to be in the periphery of a     -star both 
at   and    , unless the core player is allowed to change her investment at    . In this 
case she expects a Nash star to form at    .23 This implies that she expects to earn:  
   (      )      )  
   (
 
   
  
  
   
   
  
 )    
  
 
   
   
    
 )  
where   
  is the payoff of   being in the periphery of the   -star, i.e.   
      )      
 . 
First note that investing          
 ] will lead to lower expected payoffs than not investing. 
In this case,       
       and (by Assumption 1) no-one will link to   at   or    . Hence, 
  will be better off by not investing and linking to   at   and    . Then, the only possible 
profitable deviation is when   challenges   by investing in more units. If          ,   expects 
that all others than   will link to her at   and    , and if   is given the chance to update at 
    she will lower her investment and also link to  . This implies that she expects to earn:  
(B.7)    (      
 )      )( (    )            ) )   (
 
   
  (    )  
          ) )  
   
   
  (    )            ) )) 
Note that the payoffs in (B.7) are the largest when   invests in the smallest possible amount 
above  , i.e. when            . Then, if   (      )     (      
   ) the   -star is 
stable. This is the case when: 
                                                        
23 Of course, the     -star can also be a Nash star. This is the case in n4b22. 
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(B.8)     )       )    (      )      ))  
 
   
     )     ̂)   ) 
Note the similarity between the inequalities in (2) and (B.8). Inequality (2) was used to derive 
the value of   , i.e. the investment level at which a core player does not expect to be 
challenged. As the RHS in (B.8) is smaller than the RHS in (2), the core might actually be 
challenged in some cases. Note however that differences are very small and decreasing in  .24 
Thus, with sufficiently large status rents and forward-looking players, periphery-sponsored 
stars where the core invests in    units are stable. 
 
Uniqueness 
Now we will show that the   -stars are the only stable outcomes when   
    
 . First note 
that if a pair of players     exists for which                 and           holds, the 
outcome is unstable as   will earn a higher expected payoff by not investing. If   continues to 
invest            , she expects (by Assumption 1) not to attract any links at   and     as 
              and          . Then, at     she could either link to   or not. If she does so, 
she expects to earn  (             )           , while if she does not she expects to earn 
 (      )         . Note that both are strictly smaller than   
 , the payoff that would result if 
at     she does not invest. This implies the following lemma: 
 
Lemma B.1: If there is some player   who invests in the stage-game amount  ̂ or more, 
i.e.         ̂, any outcome where some other player   has positive investment is unstable. 
 
Which gives us the following useful corollary: 
 
Corollary B.1: All stable outcomes are either:  
(i) periphery-sponsored stars where the core invests in a positive amount and no 
periphery player invests, 
(ii) inefficient outcomes where all players have lower investments than  ̂ 
 
If   
    
 , (and, therefore,     ̂ ) the   -star is the only stable outcome when all 
outcomes described in situation (ii) of Corollary B.1 are unstable. In situation (ii) of 
Corollary C.1,         ̂      . There exists some value of investment     , such that 
                                                        
24 If this does happen, a cycle between   -stars and      )-stars is predicted by the model. 
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           )        ). That is, players who choose an investment of at least      will 
not form a link to any player   who invests     
 . Denote the number of players who are 
below this threshold and who may choose to form a link by                 . If 
       ), the strategic situation boils down to the choice of a core player in a periphery-
sponsored star, which we described above. When   updates, she will choose       
  
       (provided she is sufficiently forward-looking) and the outcome must be unstable. At 
the other extreme, when     , player   expects that any other player   who revises her 
investment at     will choose         ̂, unless   increases her investment. If she remains 
at                    ], she expects to earn  (      )        at    , while if she does 
not invest, she expects to earn   
  which is strictly larger. Hence, not investing will lead to a 
higher expected payoff for   than not changing her investment (provided she is sufficiently 
forward-looking) and the outcome must be unstable. Extending this argument shows that for 
any value of   , a player who updates will have a profitable deviation by either not investing 
of investing in  ̂ or above to attract links. Hence, any outcome in (ii) of Corollary B.1. is 
unstable when   
    
 and only the   -star is stable. Recall that all Nash stars and 
superstars are unstable when the reverse holds. 
 
Predictions for the experiment 
For all treatments with    , we have   
    
  and the behavioral model predicts that the 
  -star will form. This means, that we expect a 2-star in treatment n4b22, a 4-star in 
treatments n4b66 and n8b22 and an 8-star in treatment n8b66. In the treatments without rents 
(n4b0 and n8b0), we expect that all periphery-sponsored stars will be unstable as   
    
  in 
these treatments. We also compute the required lower bound on   for each treatment. For 
n4b0, n8b0 and n4b22     ̂   . For n4b22,   
    
  and the 2-star (the Nash star) is 
stable for any  . For n4b0 and n4b22, we obtain the following expected payoffs: 
 
   (      )       )   )  8  , 
   (      )      )    )        ) )      3)     )  37   5 , 
   (      )     )         )  4 . 
 
Nash stars are unstable when (B.3) does not hold, i.e. when one of the following two 
conditions is satisfied: 
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       (      )






   )        ) 





   
  
       (      )
       (      )      (      )
 
    )        ) )     )       ) )
    )    )     )       ) )
 
   )    )  






Hence, Nash stars are unstable when   
 
 
 and all periphery-sponsored stars are unstable 




 For treatments n4b66, n8b22 and n8b66,     ̂ and (B.2) should hold for the    to 
be stable. Below, we give the expected payoffs for our game for investing in    or below.  
 
   (      )       )   ), 
   (      )      )    )        ) )      3)     ). 
   (      )      )    )         ) )       )    ), 
   (          
 ) )      )( (    )            ) )     (    )       ), 
   (      
 )      )          ) . 
 
It is easily computed that for any level of   both    (      
 )      (      )  and 
   (      )      (          
 ) ) hold. Hence, the only relevant bounds on   come from 
   (      
 )      (      )  and    (      
 )      (      ) . Computing these 
bounds yields: 
     {
      ) (    )    ))
      )  (   )    ))
 
      ) (    )    ))
    ) 
}. 
For n8b22 this gives         44   43    44 , for n4b66         33   33  




Appendix C: Additional tables 
 
Table C.1: Payoffs and welfare in different star networks  
            66 
    4   8   4   8   4   8 
Core 
investment 
      W    W    W    W    W    W 
     22 37 103 37 191 103 169 191 345 235 301 499 653 
     82 42 288 42 616 108 354 196 770 240 486 504 1078 
   3 107 12 333 12 761 78 399 166 915 210 531 474 1223 
   4 126 -24 354 -24 858 42 420 130 1012 174 552 438 1320 
   5 129 -76 311 -76 827 -10 377 78 981 122 509 386 1289 
   6 132 -128 268 -128 796 -62 334 26 950 70 466 334 1258 
   7 133 -182 217 -182 749 -116 283 -28 903 16 415 280 1211 
   8 134 -236 166 -236 702 -170 232 -82 856 -38 364 226 1164 
   9 135 -290 115 -290 655 -224 181 -136 809 -92 313 172 1117 
      136 -344 64 -344 608 -278 130 -190 762 -146 262 118 1070 
Notes: Payoffs for core (  ) and periphery (  ) players in different star networks where the periphery players 
do not invest.  denotes the welfare level, which is defined as the sum of payoffs. 
 
Table C.2: MW tests for differences in the relative frequencies in periphery-sponsored 
stars in the final 25 periods. 
p-values  
final 25 periods 
            66 
   4   8   4   8   4   8 
    
  4 -      
  8 0.49 -     
     
  4 0.00 0.00 -    
  8 0.02 0.02 0.29 -   
  66 
  4 0.04 0.08 0.07 0.51 -  




Appendices for online publication 
 
Appendix D: Subgame perfect equilibria of the repeated game 
The finitely repeated game has a plethora of repeated game equilibria, including those where 
a stage-game equilibrium is played in each of the   periods. Here, we are interested in 
equilibria in which players earn higher payoffs than when they repeatedly play a stage-game 
equilibrium. We focus on equilibria in which superstars are consistently formed, which 
includes the efficient superstar. In addition, we restrict our attention to strict subgame perfect 
equilibria. In the GG model, all efficient outcomes are superstars. We denote the efficient 
investment level by the core player in the superstar by  ̃. 
One way to support efficient equilibria is by the use of punishment strategies. Like Benoit 
and Krishna (1985) we consider the use of „optimal punishments‟. The optimal punishment 
strategy yields the worst possible payoff for the punished player   that is feasible in a 
subgame perfect equilibrium. The average payoff for the punished player   from the optimal 
punishment in K periods of punishment is denoted by     )  , where     ) is the total 
payoff of the punished player in these   periods. Benoit and Krishna show that this payoff is 
bounded by:  
           )  ⁄      )  
where    is  ‟s minmax payoff and     )  her worst possible payoff in a stage-game 
equilibrium.  
 
One way to support (efficient and inefficient) superstars is by rotating the core position.  
 
Proposition D.1: In all of our experimental games with endogenous network formation, 
efficient superstars with a rotating core position can be supported as part of a subgame 
perfect equilibrium until period    , where      . 
 
Proof. Suppose that all players observe a perfectly correlated signal    at the beginning of 
each period  . This signal is an independent draw from the set {1, …,  }. Each integer is 
drawn with equal probability. Consider the strategy profile   , where each player‟s strategy 
  
  adheres to: 
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“In each period, the player who is assigned the core position is determined by the draw of   , 
i.e. if     , player   will be in the core position in period  . In a period, the core player 
does not form any links, and all other players only form a link to this core player. In the first 
T-Q periods the core player invests     ̂ and in the final Q periods the core player invests 
the stage-game Nash level  ̂ . If some player   deviates in period  , play switches to the 
punishment regime and the deviating player will be punished in periods     to   by the 
optimal punishment strategy.” 
 
The strategy profile    constitutes a subgame perfect equilibrium if it satisfies the one-stage-
deviation principle. That is, the strategy profile    is a subgame perfect equilibrium if and 
only if: 
       
     
 )    (  
     
 )           
 , 
where   
  indicates a deviant strategy of player  , which differs from the equilibrium strategy 
   only in period   and conforms to    thereafter (see for instance, Theorem 4.1 in 
Fudenberg and Tirole 1991, p.109, for a proof). 
Let   
  and   
  denote the stage-game payoff of being, respectively, in the core or the 
periphery of the superstar where the core invests in   . Likewise, we write   
  and   
  for the 
payoff of being, respectively, in the core or the periphery of the Nash star where the core 
invests in  ̂.  
In   , the final   periods consist of a sequence of stage-game equilibria, hence, a 
profitable one-stage-deviation can only exist in the first     periods. First consider 
deviations by the core in these periods. The optimal deviation by the core player in a 
superstar is to invest in the Nash level  ̂, which implies that a Nash star would result. Hence, 
by deviating in period      , the sum of payoffs in periods   to   of core player   will 
be:  
     (  
     
 )    
      )
      )
   
.  
The expected payoff from following   
  is  ̅  







  in each of the first     
periods and  ̅  







  in each of the final   periods. In every period      , 
the core player in the superstar will not deviate if: 
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(D.1)    
        ) ̅    ̅    
      )
      )
   
. 
As  ̅   ̅      )  
      )
   
, it suffices to consider only period      . Using this, we 
can rewrite (D.1) to obtain: 
(D.2)     
  
    
 
 ̅      )  ⁄
, 
which gives a condition for the minimal length of the „Nash phase‟ that is needed to avoid 
deviation by the core.
25
 As  ̅      )  
      )
   
 and   
    
 , the right hand side of (D.2) 
is always positive.  
If    , we have        )    
 . Using this in (D.2), we can compute for our 
game that   3 if   4     and     if   8    .26 Similarly, in our games with 
status rents, the worst stage-game equilibrium payoff is the periphery position in the Nash 
star. Using this as the average punishment payoff     )  ⁄  in case of deviation, we find that 
     if   4     ,   5  if   8     ,     if   4   66  and     if 
  8   66 are needed to sustain the efficient superstar with     ̃  4. This shows that 
no core player will deviate in the first     periods for the above bounds on  . 
Now consider deviations by a periphery player  . Note that within a period, the 
periphery player best responds by linking to the core in the superstar. If a periphery player 
deviates, she will be punished in all     remaining periods. The expected future payoffs in 
case of deviation are thus       ). As  ̅
   ̅      )  
      )
   
, the expected future 
payoff of adhering to the strategy   
  is strictly larger than the future payoffs of deviation. 
Hence, no periphery player will deviate, which shows that the strategy profile    constitutes 
a subgame perfect equilibrium. Q.E.D. 
 
Superstars with a fixed core player 
Given that in practice rotation schemes are rarely implemented, we now focus on equilibria 
where a fixed periphery-sponsored star is formed in all periods. We divide the game in two 
phases: a „superstar phase‟ where a superstar with a fixed core is played in the first     
periods, and an „end phase‟ which consist of the final   periods. 
                                                        
25 Proposition D.1 holds whenever (D.2) is fulfilled. We have restricted the proposition to our experimental 
games in order to keep the notation as simple as possible. 
26 More specifically, if   4     we have   
  
 






Proposition D.2: Consider the set of equilibria where (1) on the equilibrium path a 
periphery-sponsored star with a fixed core player is formed and (2) in a punishment phase 
the same network is formed in each of the remaining periods; then status rents are necessary 
for the formation of superstars in the repeated game equilibrium.  
 
Proof. In this type of equilibrium, the efficient superstar is played in periods 1 to     and a 
Nash star is played in the final   periods. In every period, the same player   fills the core 
position. Note that we rule out rotations on the equilibrium path as well as in a possible 
punishment phase. Now, consider the following strategy profile   : 
 
“In each period, the same player   is assigned the core position. This player does not form 
any link, and all other players only form a link to this core player. In the first     periods 
the core player invests the superstar level     ̂ and in the final Q periods the core player 
invests the stage-game Nash level  ̂. If some player j deviates in period  , play switches to the 
punishment regime and the deviating player will be punished in periods     to   by the 
optimal punishment strategy.” 
 
First, consider deviations by the core player. As before, the optimal deviation by the core in 
the superstar phase is to lower her investment to  ̂, which results in a Nash star. Hence, the 
core will not deviate in the first     periods if: 
(D.3)           )  
     
    
      )    ) 
and will have a profitable deviation if the reverse holds. If   
      ) it is sufficient to 
consider only period    , while if   
      ) it is sufficient to consider only the final 
period of the superstar phase, i.e.      . 
First consider the game without status rents. As before,     )    
 . As   
    
  for 
any     ̂, we consider period    . Using this in (D.3) reduces the condition to   
    
  
which is not true. Thus, the reverse sign holds in (D.3) and a profitable deviation exists for 
the core player. Hence, the strategy profile    does not constitute a subgame perfect 
equilibrium in the absence of status rents. Q.E.D. 
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Now, we will show that superstars with a fixed core can indeed be sustained in our treatments 
with status rents. In our treatments with status rents    )    
 . In treatment n4b22, 
  
    
  for any     ̂, therefore we consider period    . In this case, the minimal length 
of the Nash phase becomes: 
    
  
      )  (    )   
 )
  
    
  . 
Computing this for     ̃, gives   46, which implies that an efficient superstar with a 
fixed core can be supported but only from period 1 to 29. In the other treatments with status 
rents (i.e. n8b22, n4b66 and n8b66)   
    
 , which implies that it is sufficient to consider 
the last period of the superstar phase. Using this in eq. (D.3) yields:  
(D.4)     
  
    
 
  
      )
, 
which provides a condition for the minimal length of the Nash phase. As    )    
 , and the 
payoff in the periphery of the Nash star is strictly smaller than   
  when     ̃  4 , 
condition (D.4) implies that     in n8b22, n4b66 and n8b66. In the final   periods, the 
Nash star will be played, which is a stage-game Nash network. Hence, the core player has no 
profitable one-stage-deviation. Note that also superstars with higher core-investment than 4 
units could be supported in this manner. Superstars can be supported in this way until the 
penultimate period as long as   
    
 . Table C.1. in Appendix C lists the payoffs in 
different star networks. In n8b22, superstars where    4  can be supported until the 
penultimate period, in n4b66 this is the case for    5 and in n8b66 for      .  
Finally, consider the periphery players in the game with status rents. Again, within a 
period, the periphery players best respond by linking to the core in the superstar. If a 
periphery player deviates, she will be punished in all               periods. The average 
future payoffs in case of deviation are thus     ). As   
    
      ), the future payoffs 
of adhering to the strategy are strictly larger than the future payoffs of deviation. Hence, no 
periphery player will deviate, which shows that the strategy profile    constitutes a subgame 
perfect equilibrium in the treatments with status rents, and that efficient superstars can be 




Appendix E: Experimental instructions and test questions 
All text in red italics is treatment specific. Treatment specific text is denoted by: <n4> and 
<n8> for   4  and   8  respectively, <ENDO> and <EXO> for endogenous and 
exogenous networks respectively and <b0>, <b22> and <b66> for the respective level of 
status rents. All public good investments and links in examples and test questions are 
independently and randomly generated for each subject. 
 
Welcome! 
Welcome to this experiment on decision-making. During the experiment, you are not allowed 
to communicate with other participants. If you have any questions, please raise your hand. 
One of the experimenters will come to you to answer your question. 
 
During the experiment you can earn points. These points are worth money. How many points 
(and hence how much money) you earn depends on your own decisions, the decisions of 
others and chance. Your decisions are anonymous. They will not be linked to your name. 
 
Every 30 points are equivalent to 0.10 euro. 
 
At the end of the experiment the points that you earned will be converted to euros and the 
amount will be paid to you privately, in cash. 
 
Today's experiment consists of two parts. You will spend most time on the second part. The 
second part will be explained after you have finished the first part. Your decision in the first 
part has no influence on the proceedings of the second part and your decisions in the second 
part do not affect the proceedings of the first part. 
 
Instructions first part 
You are now given 600 points. You must decide how many points you want to invest in a 
lottery. The points that you do not invest will be added your total earnings at the end of the 
experiments and paid out to you in cash. 
 
The lottery: You have a chance of 50% of losing the amount you invest and a 50% chance of 
winning two and a half times the amount you invested. 
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Whether you win or lose in the lottery is determined by chance. For this, you choose whether 
you want to play heads or tails. If the outcome of the lottery is the same as your choice, you 
win. The chance of heads or tails is equal: both occur with 50% probability. The outcome of 
the lottery will be announced to you at the end of the experiment. 
 
In summary, your earnings in the lottery are determined as follows. If you decide to invest X 
points in the lottery and you win the lottery, you earn the number of points that you did not 
invest in the lottery plus two and a half times the number of points that you did invest in the 
lottery. Thus, your earnings will then be: 
 
600 - X + 2.5 X. 
 
If you lose then you will only earn the points that you did not invest. Your earnings will then 
be: 
 
600 - X. 
 
If you have any questions, please raise you hand and one of the experimenters will come to 










Instructions second part 
Please read the following instructions carefully. After reading the instructions we will ask 
you several questions to test whether you understand the experiment. The experiment will 
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continue after you answered all questions correctly. While reading the instructions, you can 
browse back and forth between pages by using the menu on the top of your screen. 
 
Your total earnings consist of the points you earn in the first part of the experiment (the 
lottery) and the sum of all points that you earn in the second part of the experiment. At the 
beginning of the second part you will receive a starting capital of 2000 points. This will also 
be added to your earnings. 
 
As before, every 30 points are equivalent to 0.10 euro 
 
The second part of the experiment consists of 75 rounds. You have now been randomly 
placed in a group of <n4> 4 <n8> 8 participants. The composition of this group will not 
change during the experiment. In this group you will be randomly assigned a role. This role 
will be indicated by a letter: <n4> "A", "B", "C" or "D" <n8> "A", "B", "C", "D", "E", "F", 
"G" or "H". The letters <n4> "A", "B", "C" and "D" <n8> "A", "B", "C", "D", "E", "F", "G" 
and "H" will thus refer to the same participant throughout the entire experiment.  
 
Everybody in your group has received the exact same instructions. However, it may be that 
people that are not in your group will participate in a different experiment. 
 
Costs and benefits 
Every round you can earn points by having „access‟ to units of a good. The number of points 
that you earn depends on the number of units that you have access to. This is shown in the 
following table: 
Units 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 10+i 
Benefits 0 92 152 177 196 199 202 203 204 205 206 206+i 
 
The table shows for instance that you earn 152 points if you have access to 2 units and that 
you earn 204 points if you have access to 8 units of the good. 
 
There are two ways to access units of the good.  
1. You buy units of the good yourself. 
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2. You <ENDO> make <EXO> have a „link‟ to another participant. In this case you 
have access to the units that the other participant has bought. 
 
<b22 b66> In addition, you will earn points if other participants make a link to you. For each 
link that another participant makes to you, you will receive <b22> 22 points. <b66> 66 
points. 
 
Buying units and <ENDO> making <EXO> having links is costly. 
 
The cost of <ENDO> making <EXO> having a link is 70 points for each role. Every round, 
you can maximally <ENDO> make <EXO> have one link to each of the other roles. This 
means that you cannot <ENDO> make <EXO> have more than 3 links. 
 
<EXO> You yourself will not decide on your links, like others will not decide on their links. 
When you decide on how many units you want to buy, you will be informed about the links 
that you will have in the current round. The number of units that you buy does not affect links 
in the current or future periods. Similarly, the links that others buy neither affect links in the 
current of future rounds. The participants in this experiment do not have any influence on 
how the links evolve. 
 
The cost of buying units is 55 points per unit. Every round, you can maximally buy 10 units 
of the good. 
 
In summary: 
Cost per unit 55 
Cost per link 70 











The table and the figure above show a possible outcome of a round. The table and figure 
merely serve as an example, the content does not give any information on what to expect in 
the experiment. The numbers chosen for this example have been chosen randomly and are 
different for each participant. 
 
The decisions of your role are displayed in orange and the decisions of the other roles are 
displayed in blue. In the example, your role is A. In the figure, roles are indicated by the 
letters <n4> A, B, C and D <n8> A, B, C, D, E, F, G and H. The number of units a participant 
bought is indicated by the colored circles. The larger the acquisition of a participant is, the 
darker is the circle at the corresponding role. In the example, the participant in role B bought 
3 unit(s) and the participant in role D bought 10 units. The blue circle at role D is thus darker 
than the blue circle at role B. The acquisitions of all participants are also listed in the table. 
 
In the figure, links are indicated by arrows. The arrow points away from the one who made 
the link. In this case, A <ENDO> made <EXO> has a link to B, B <ENDO> made <EXO> 
has a link to A, C <ENDO> made <EXO> has links to A and D and the participant in <n4> 
role D <n8> roles D, E, F, G and H <ENDO> made <EXO> has no links. These decisions 
are also listed in the table. 
 




role units bought link to 
A 3 B 
B 3 A 
C 8 A D 




You bought 3 units -165 
You <ENDO> made <EXO> have 1 link(s) -70 
Access to 6 units 202 
<b22 b66 ENDO> 2 link(s) made to you 
<b22 b66 EXO> 2 link(s) to you 
<b22> 44 <b66> 132 
Earnings this round <b22> 11<b66> 99 
 
Practice questions I 
Your group of four participants: 
Is the same in every round 
 Changes from round to round 
 
Which statement is correct: 
 Your role is the same in every round 
 Your role is determined randomly every round 
 
How many points do you earn if you access 3 units of the good? 
_____ points 
 
How many points does it cost to <ENDO> make <EXO> have a link to another participant? 
_____ points 
 
<b22 b66 ENDO> How many points do you earn for each link that is made to you? 




Practice questions II (identical setup for Practice questions III)
 
 
The table and the figure above show a possible outcome of a round. The table and figure 
merely serve as an example, the content has been generated randomly and gives no 
information on what to expect in the experiment. 
 
What are your total costs for <ENDO> making <EXO> having links in the example above? 
_____ points 
 




How many units of the good do you access in total in the example above? 
_____ points 
 
What are your benefits of accessing units of the good in the example above? 
_____ points 
 
<b22 b66 ENDO> How many points do you earn for the links that are made to your role? 
<b22 b66 EXO> How many points do you earn for the links to your role? 
_____ points 
 
What would be your earnings in the example above? 
_____ points 
role units bought link to 
A 4 B 
B 7 D 
C 3  
D 2 A 
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End of instructions 
You have reached the end of the instructions. You can still go back by using the menu above. 
If you are ready, click on 'continue' below. If you need help, please raise your hand 
 
Hand-out printed summary 
Summary 
Your total earnings consist of the points you earn in the first part of the experiment (the 
lottery) and the sum of all points that you earn in the second part of the experiment. At the 
beginning of the second part you will receive a starting capital of 2000 points. This will also 
be added to your earnings. 
Every 30 points are equivalent to 0.10 euro 
The second part of the experiment consists of 75 rounds. You have now been randomly 
placed in a group of <n4> 4 <n8> 8 participants. The composition of this group will not 
change during the experiment. In this group you will be randomly assigned a role. This role 
will be indicated by a letter: <n4> "A", "B", "C" or "D" <n8> "A", "B", "C", "D", "E", "F", 
"G" or "H". The letters <n4> "A", "B", "C" and "D" <n8> "A", "B", "C", "D", "E", "F", "G" 
and "H" will thus refer to the same participant throughout the entire experiment. 
Every round you can earn points by having „access‟ to units of a good. The number of points 
that you earn depends on the number of units that you have access to. This is shown in the 
following table: 
Units 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 10+i 
Benefits 0 92 152 177 196 199 202 203 204 205 206 206+i 
 
The table shows for instance that you earn 152 points if you have access to 2 units and that 
you earn 204 points if you have access to 8 units of the good. 
 
There are two ways to access units of the good.  
1. You buy units of the good yourself. 
2. You <ENDO> make <EXO> have a „link‟ to another participant. In this case you 
have access to the units that the other participant has bought. 
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<b22 b66> In addition, you will earn points if other participants make a link to you. For each 
link that another participant makes to you, you will receive <b22> 22 points. <b66> 66 
points. 
 
Buying units and <ENDO> making <EXO> having links is costly. 
 
The cost of <ENDO> making <EXO> having a link is 70 points for each role. Every round, 
you can maximally <ENDO> make <EXO> have one link to each of the other roles. This 
means that you cannot <ENDO> make <EXO> have more than 3 links. 
 
<EXO> You yourself will not decide on your links, like others will not decide on their links. 
When you decide on how many units you want to buy, you will be informed about the links 
that you will have in the current round. The number of units that you buy does not affect links 
in the current or future periods. Similarly, the links that others buy neither affect links in the 
current of future rounds. The participants in this experiment do not have any influence on 
how the links evolve. 
 
The cost of buying units is 55 points per unit. Every round, you can maximally buy 10 units 
of the good. 
 
In summary: 
Cost per unit 55 
Cost per link 70 








Appendix F: Screen shots 
 
